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According to Newmann and Morgenstein, a transformation system is narrowed by the natural 
operation of the confines of availability, where two availabilities are combined by the following 
two complementary probabilities:  
 
α                                                                       (1) 
 
1-α(0<α<1)                                                                (2) 
 
Assume the utilities to be “u” and “v”, these utilities are shown in the following natural 
concern and natural operation, respectively: 
 
u＞v                                                                     (3) 
 
αu+(1-α)v(0<α<1)                                                          (4) 
 
(3) means that “u is better than v” and (4) is the median point of “u” and “v” which provides 
“α,1-α” at a significance level. Moreover, (3) is the amalgamaion which chooses “u” by 
probability “α.” Similarly, (4) is the amalgamation which chooses “v” by probability “1-α.” It is 
necessary to find the following relation between “utility and numbers,” if the measurement in 
which being of these conceptions and its reappear are possible is accepted:  
 
u→p＝v(u)                                                                   (5) 
 
Where two “u>v” (concerning availability) and operation “α+(1-α) v” should discover the 
availability and concerns in the same conception. This relation is assumed in (5), where “u” is 
the utility and “v (u)” is a number given by the relation. Newmann and Morgenstein raised the 
following formulas in this relation:  
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If u>v, then v(u) >v(v)                                                       (6) 
 
v(αu+(1-α)v)=αv(u)+(1-α)v(v)                                              (7) 
 
Suppose the following two relations exist: 
 
u→ρ=v(u)                                                                (8) 
 
u→ρ’＝v’(u)                                                            (9) 
 
Then, (10) is transformed from (8) and (9).  
  
ρ⇔ρ’                                                                 (10) 
 
Further, (10) is transformed as follows: 
 
ρ’=φ(ρ)                                                                  (11) 
 
(8) and (9) replace (6) and (7), respectively. Therefore, the transformation of (10), where 
“Function φ(ρ)” retains “Function ρ>σ” and “Operation αρ+(1-α)σ.” According to Newmann 
and Morgenstein, this is described as follows:  
 
If ρ>σ, then φ(ρ)>φ(σ)                                                  (12) 
 
Therefore, “φ(σ)” is transformed into the following linear expressions:  
 
ρ’=φ(ρ)=ω0ρ+ω1                                                     (13) 
 
However, “ω0,ω1” are constant numbers. Moreover, “ω0>0”, the mathematical expression 
of these chains solved the following about utility. If the numerical assessment of availability 
exists, it will settle, except in linear expression transformations. Considering this logic, the 
existence of numerical transformation will provide clarity, if the following are solved:  “related 




2. Option and interpretation of the system of axioms 
 According to Newmann and Morgenstein, an axiom is needed to attain a specific purpose. 
Moreover, an axiom should be as simple as possible and should include intuitive fairness. 
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Newmann and Morgenstein interpreted mathematical axioms and attempted to evaluate the 
conception by clarifying the correspondence of “(6) and (7)→(8).” However, the axiom is 
formulized by one in order to attain intuitive and aesthetic causes.  
 The system of axioms of Newmann and Morgenstein is as follows. The “system U” exists 
temporarily. The components of “system U” are “u, v, w,...” U contains “related u>v” and the 
arbitrary numbers “α (0< α<1).” In that case, the following operation is given to U:  
 
 αu+(1-α) v=w                                                            (14) 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that (14) fulfills the following axioms (Newmann and 
Morgenstein): “u>v is all the order relation in U.” Considering (15), only one is materialized 
among the following three concerns:  
 
u>v, u<v, and u=v                                                          (15) 
 
The result will be “u >w” if v>w is “u> v.”  
 
Moreover, order relation is expressed by the following joint operation:  
 
If “u<v”, then “u<αu+(1-α) v”                                                (16) 
 
If “u >v”, then “u >αu+(1-α) v”                                               (17) 
 
In “u >w> v,” α which replaces “w>αu+(1-α) v” exists                             (18) 
 
Further, the joint operation is as follows:  
 
“αu+(1-α) v = v+α(1-α) u”                                                  (19) 
  
α（βu+(1-β))+(1-α)v=γu +(1-γ)v                                             (20) 
 
However, γ=αβ                                                            (21) 
 
These axioms specify “(6) and (7) →(8).” Therefore, the conclusion of “1” is applied to U, 
where in this section, U is a system of abstract availability. However, it serves as “a number of 
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3. General theory about the system of axioms 
Newmann and Morgenstein have described the axiomatic account of utility and I described the 
preceding clause that “(6) and (7) draw the numerical personality of availability.” (7) can 
combine the figure of availability, such as a mathematical expectation (probability) (Newmann 
and Morgenstein). However, the mathematical expectation as a conception presents 
interrogatory, where it is dependent on the fairness of the conception on a certain “assumption” 
about the personality of “expectancy.” In short, in a case such as a bet, the availability of the act 
is incompatible with a mathematical expectation. According to Newmann and Morgenstein, the 
system of axioms “(15)-(19), (20), and (21)” avoid the capability of the availability of a bet. 
Moreover, according to them, this system of axioms does not avoid this matter intentionally. 
As a result, axioms (20) and (21) are the same and use a mathematical expectation. Furthermore, 
the numerical availability of fulfilling this axiom is drawn by a system of axioms “(15)-(19), 
(20), and (21).” This defines the mathematical availability which can actually apply the 
calculation of mathematical expectation. The conceptual constitution required for this is 
guaranteed from a system of axioms “(15)-(19), (20), and (21).” 
 The system of axioms of Newmann and Morgenstein is based on the relation and operation 
of availability. In this case, operation is provided more directly than the relation of availability 
Because the person who can imagine two availability “(u, v)” Status is respectively fixed 
Probability “(α,1-α)”, and it has these two Status simultaneously. On the other hand, the 
assumption produced by the axiom about “u>v,” (completeness of this order), may have 
misdoubts. For example, any case with the availability “u and v” could not be determined 
correctly. However, even if this misdoubt has a big value, this capability (completeness of the 
individual preference structure) must be assumed in the indifference curve analysis. However, if 
this personality (related to “u>v”) is assumed, numerical availability will be acquired by the 
operation “(αu+(1-α)v” which is a marginally doubtful point (Newmann and Morgenstein).  
In addition to this, Newmann and Morgenstein mentioned the following important matters. 
First, they made availability to one person object of the research. That is, these consideration 
does not derive the availability of other person differs. Second, their research is inapplicable to 




4. Role of a final utility concept 
Considering the above-mentioned issue, Newmann and Morgenstein specified the efficiency of 
a numeric availability concept. Moreover, in an objective status, an economic agent assumes 
that material conditions are known (Newmann and Morgenstein). All the economic agents 
perform statistical and mathematical operations under such a status. This is premised on full 
knowledge of the material conditions by an economic agent and can be set objectively. This 
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important nature has been highlighted by several researches. However, this review is 
insufficient.    
Newmann and Morgenstein do not consider this issue in depth. Rather, their consideration 
assumes the “information perfection nature” on the material conditions of the objective status. 
Generally, economic and social phenomena that depend on the individual “information 
imperfection nature” appear in their rationale. Thus, their rationale assumes the “perfect nature 
of information” and it is stated that these phenomena are not related to individual 
“imperfections of information.” A remarkable example of this is shown by “discrimination,” 
“tolerant plundering,” “accommodation,” and “transfer” (Newmann and Morgenstein). 
Furthermore, they made an exception to “information imperfection” by seriously considering 
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